• Speaker : Chenglu Jin
  • Location : ITE 401
  • Date : September 12th, 2018
  • Time : 1:00 - 2:00 PM


Since the famous cyber warfare, Stuxnet, was known to the world, the security issues of industrial control systems or cyber-physical systems draw a huge amount of attention. Most of the cyber-physical systems in practice are still using legacy devices, which offer very limited computational power and almost no security protection. Cryptography, as a basic primitive to achieve security goals, is sometimes considered to be too expensive in computation for legacy systems. In this dissertation, we will show how to efficiently leverage the limited computational power on CPS devices to secure a CPS under the attacks initiated from sensors, controllers and servers using cryptographic methods. More specifically, we will present an intrusion-tolerant and privacy-preserving sensor fusion scheme, a lightweight intrusion detection system for CPSs, and a two-factor authenticated key exchange protocol based on historical data.