A Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES Using CP
- Speaker : Laurent Michel
- Location : ITE 401
- Date : April 3rd, 2018
- Time : 1:00 - 2:00 PM
AES is a mainstream block cipher used in many protocols and whose resilience against attack is essential for cybersecurity. In , Oren et al. discuss a Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Analysis (TASCA) and show how to use optimization technology to exploit side-channel information and mount a computational attack against AES. This paper revisits the results and posits that Constraint Programming is a strong contender and a potent optimization solution. It extends bit-vector solving as introduced in , develops a CP and an IP model and compares them with the original Pseudo-Boolean formulation. The empirical results establish that CP can deliver solutions with orders of magnitude improvement in both run time and memory usage, traits that are essential to potential adoption by cryptographers.
Laurent Michel is a professor of Computer Science and Engineering at UConn. He comes from the area of combinatorial optimization. Laurent received a B.S. and an Sc.M. in Computer Science from “Les Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix” (‘93) in Namur, Belgium. He later received an Sc.M. (‘96) and Ph.D. (‘99) degrees in Computer Science from Brown University.